tion and economic growth. An empirical analysis of Russian regions for 2005-2012 shows that excessive expenditure decentralization within the region, which is not accompanied transfers from the federal center is positively associated with economic growth.
ment among different levels of government and a system of intergovernmental can be considered as a necessary condition of the latter because there is no point centralization (in this case, all resources, authority and responsibilities are concentrated at the federal level).
should be responsible for macroeconomic stabilization and income redistribution, whereas subnational (regional and local) authorities, which are closer to citizens and possess more information on their preferences, should ensure the ef--than that of the centralized provision because lower levels of government can improve the well-being of residents through a more comprehensive satisfaction of their individual needs (preference-matching argument).
ciency can also be higher under decentrali zation because subnational authorities, which have better knowledge of citizens' needs and experience in providing respective public goods, can produce such goods at lower cost. 2 Another advantage tion, which, in turn, may limit the size of the public sector and its predatory incendecentralization may encourage a higher accountability of subnational authorities stances (Prud'homme, 1995) . Excessive decentralization makes macroeconomic stability and income redistribution nearly unachievable. In times of crises, macroeconomic stabilization becomes problematic because the federal government priori ties. Income redistribution also does not work under full decentralization. Resources are usually unevenly distributed among territories (at least in large decentralization is the inability of subnational governments to fully internalize cross-regional externalities, which raises doubt regarding the theoretical conclu-
Fiscal decentralization and economic growth: Theory and empirics
-centralization reforms in (former) socialist states in the late 1980s -early 1990s
The advocates of these reforms needed a theoretically and empirically justi-
The most common analytical framework that links expenditure decentralization has two inputs, namely private capital and public spending, by three levels of taxes on output. Maximizing the utility function of a representative agent with respect to a dynamic budget constraint provides the following solution: output growth rate depends, inter alia, on the shares of different levels of government in total public expenditure. From the model, it is also possible to calculate growthpublic expenditure is excessively centralized, decentralization can be conducive to economic growth. The augmented Solow model (Mankiw et al., 1992 ) also provides the basis for econometric analysis of the relationship between decentralization and growth economic growth that are derived from the Solow model (initial output value, physical and human capital accumulation, and labor force growth), in the empiriother conditioning factors as independent variables.
t consists of two overlapping generations, the young and the old (each agent dividuals can invest part of their time in education because it raises their future income and can work the remainder of the time. In addition, a young generation als devote all of their time to work. A consumption bundle of each generation consists of two goods: private and public. The old generation, whose disposable income is higher ( because their level of human capital is higher, and they do not spend their time on schooling), can consume more, thus having higher de-(federalism ) and centra lized (unitary). Under federalism, it is assumed that a perfect Tiebout-sorting mechanism allows individuals to sort themselves in two demand-homogeneous jurisdictions with different levels of the public good provision (higher for old than for young). Under the unitary system, a common level of the public good is provided for all individuals. According to the proposition presented by the author, the time spent on education and levels of physi-um. Economic growth, determined by the human capital growth rate, is, hence, higher under federalism. This model, which is excessively abstract and cannot be implemented empirically, provides insights on how federalism (in the form Summing up the previous research on the theoretical relationship between fy four potential channels of this relationship: heterogeneity of preferences, market preservation, structural change, and political innovation. Heterogeneity of preferences Market preservation -tives of subnational authorities, improves the conditions for market development, and ultimately accelerates economic growth. Structural change is related to potential positive effects of decentralization during structural crises (e.g., when there is a permanent negative demand shock encountered by a particular industry). Structural change is easier to implement under decentralization be-Political innovation means that region, it may be further disseminated among other regions, which creates new opportunities for economic growth. of such a relationship? ization and economic growth, both from a cross-country and regional perspec-studies, researchers refer to the multidimensional nature of decentralization and revenue decentralization is positively related to the long-run growth prospects (in cases when expenditures are more decentralized than revenues). In other revenue and expenditure at regional and local levels is positively related to ecoand Kroijer, 2009) and creates positive incentives for subnational authorities to preserve market institutions (Jin et al., 2005) . for a long period of time. Nevertheless, there is no consensus on the direction and positively linked to the transition to a new system of revenue assignment among -sult: the convergence of subnational revenues and expenditures is negatively growth in the USA, researchers also obtain contradictory results. For instance, and conclude that there is no strong link between expenditure decentralization and growth, i.e., the exiting degree of decentralization suits the purpose of maximizing relationship between both expenditure and revenue decentralization and economic growth at the state level (Akai and Sakata, 2002), as well as a negative correlation between the degree of decentralization and the volatility of economic growth in The main lessons that need to be learned from the numerous empirical studies described above are that the multidimensional nature of decentralization (at least its revenue and expenditure dimension) should be considered, and the major determinants of economic growth should necessarily be included in the econometric model to prevent the omitted variable bias.
Fiscal federalism development in the Russian Federation
a pendulum motion. The highly centralized budget system of the late Soviet Union underwent spontaneous decentralization during a transition period of the early companied by the preservation of political control over provinces by the central political decentralization, whereas the recentralization of the budget system in model proposed for Russia by certain researchers and policy-makers was not attempted in reality. the scope of this paper but covered extensively in Yushkov (2014) . The most relevant studies on this issue include the report Intergovernmental Reforms in the Russian Federation
The relationship between decentralization and economic growth is also considered for the case of Turkey and Yossifov, 1999; Shleifer, 2005; Solanko and Tekoniemi, 2005) . decentralization and regional economic growth at the latest stage of development by the continuing recentralization of budget revenues and the increased dependence of regions on intergovernmental transfers from the federal center.
Fiscal decentralization and regional economic growth in the Russian
Federation ( GRP_GR) is that characterize the degree of decentralization include the intra regional revenue decentralization (DEC_1), which is the share of self-generated municipal revenues (without transfers) in total revenues of the consolidated regional budget 5 ; intraregional expenditure decentralization (DEC_2), which is the share of consolito higher levels) in the total expenditures of the consolidated regional budget; dependence of a region on intergovernmental transfers from the federal budget (IGT ), which is the share of intergovernmental transfers (unconditional grants, subsidies, subventions) in total revenues of the consolidated regional budget; and the municipal autonomy indicator (AU ), which is the share of self-generated revenues of all municipalities in consolidated muni cipal revenues of the respective region. Petersburg are two federal cities that are excluded from the analysis because their budget 5 The consolidated regional budget in Russia consists of the regional budget and consolidated municipal budgets (i.e., budgets of all municipalities present in the respective region). are considered but also the real authority of regions and municipalities to impose new taxes, to change tax rates, tax bases and federal tax deductions, and to cessfully applied in this paper because it is tailored primarily to cross-country interregional variation in the degree of decentralization. The reason is that regions and muni cipalities extremely limited authority over revenues and expenditures and cannot impose new taxes or change the tax base (particular tax rates may be changed but only within narrow limits), whereas spending priorities are often imposed by the federal government (in other words, such a sophisticated variable will tend to zero for most regions). INV_SHARE ); the regional share of total natural resource production (RES_SHARE ); the tax burden or tax pressure, measured by the share TAX_IN_GRP); the regional population growth (POP_GROWTH ); the trade openness ratio of the regional economy, the ratio of OPENNESS); one of the possible indicators of human capital development, i.e., the share of higher educational institutions graduates in total population of the region (ALUMNI INFL); GRP_PC_LAG ) to test the conditional convergence hypothesis.
A few key conclusions should be noted regarding the descriptive statistics. First, the degree of intraregional expenditure decentralization far exceeds the degree of revenue decentralization (average level of DEC_2 over 8 years is 50%; DEC_1municipalities. In other words, the municipal tax base does not correspond to its spending authority. 6 Second, the dependence of regions on transfers from the fed-get revenues). Third, the average annual economic growth rates over the period the average rate of population growth was negative during the entire eight years. Table 1 shows descriptive statistics for the most important variables presented above (average values) for the 10 best and 10 worst regions in terms of regional -Nevertheless, there are exceptions that reject this hypothesis: Sakhalin Region 6 The formal allocation of revenue and expenditure powers between different levels of the budget system can the outsider regions, whereas the average dependence on transfers from the fed-Thus, based on the descriptive statistics analysis, it is possible to conclude that decentralization was negatively related to growth in Russian regions in the selected time period, whereas the dependence on transfers during the crisis was Table 1 demonstrates the heterogeneity of Russian regions in terms of the degree of intraregional revenue (to a greater extent) and expenditure decentralization. The varying degrees of decentralization may be caused by the general economic heterogeneity of regions (following, inter alia, from differences in the natural resource endowments): relatively poor regions are characterized by low living standards and low value of property, which raises problems with col-al budget revenues (e.g., in Dagestan and Tuva, DEC_1 is 0.10, whereas the avertion within a region has a relatively high correlation with revenue decentralization; as a general rule, the more income a municipality generates, the greater share of expenditures in the consolidated regional budget it takes. Moreover, differences in expenditure decentralization are caused by the different approaches towards allocating authority between the region and municipalities, which vary across Russian regions.
Empirical methodology
where GRP_GR it i in year t; i denotes t is the vector of time effects (dummy variables) ; DEC it 8 ; TAX it indi-Including time effects in the regression model is extremely important for the period of interest (2005-2012) because it allows to control the economy on economic growth. cates the tax burden; and X it is a set of basic and additional control variables. The basic independent variables (determinants of economic growth) include of total natural resource production are used as additional conditioning factors. Unemployment is not considered as a control variable in this study due to two may cause an endogeneity problem due to its bi-directional causality with economic growth. 9
10
The disadvantage of the FE model is that it is impossible to analyze an impact of dummy variables for federal districts). Nonetheless, the advantage of this model is that the unobserved heterogeneity, i.e., the entire set of time-invariant factors,
Results and conclusions
The intraregional expenditure decentralization (column 2) is negatively and dependence on transfers from the federal budget (column 4) is positively and sig-11 The remaining decentralization measures
These results imply that government expenditures in Russian regions are excessively decentralized, which causes a negative relationship between expenditure decentralization and regional economic growth. At the same time, self-generated revenues of municipalities are only 50% of their total revenues (the second -the intraregional revenue decentralization and the growth of real industrial production (1992 -1996 ) (Freinkman and Yossifov, 1999 . It should be noted that 9 Multicollinearity is not an issue here because independent variables in the regression are not highly 10 interest. 11 economic growth remained the same. these authors consider a shorter time period and do not include most of the necessary control variables in their analysis, which leads to the omitted variable bias. The difference between our results can also be explained by the fact that in centration of resources and authority at the federal level, and minimization of opportunities for regions to engage in political bargaining for authority and in-At the same time, a high dependence of a region on intergovernmental transfers is positively correlated with economic growth (or, conversely, negative-- decentralization within a region. For instance, a regional government receives a particular anti-crisis program instead of providing additional resources to less rentier regions (transfer-dependent regions and Plekhanov, 2008a,b) in which the negative correlation between expenditure natural resources recovered faster after the crisis and grew faster (positive and sig-RES_SHARE variable), which was most likely caused by the favorable conditions in the energy market. economic growth described in the theoretical part of the article, we can assume that they do not function eralism. Market preservation is not working (and did not work in the 1990s, markets and encourage business activity; an increased tax base (resulting from faster market development) will lead to reduced transfers from higher level budgets. The heterogeneity of preferences only works in relation to major cities and Political innovations may be used by the federal center in the future to conduct economic experiments (e.g., to introduce new local taxes), although currently, this channel also does not function properly. The structural change channel does receive support in times of crises (bailouts) both from subnational and federal of intergovernmental relations ism to be fully realized in the Russian Federation, thus slowing down economic growth and impeding consistent development of regions and municipalities.
Russian regions and its potential link to regional economic growth. Identifying a clear causal relationship between decentralization and growth (or, more broadly , development) and solving the issues of dual causality and endogeneity in the model falls beyond the scope of this article, although it is of substantial interest for the fu-
